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Civil Procedure-Acquiring Diversity Jurisdiction Over An
Unincorporated Association
Federal diversity jurisdiction is premised on the existence of diversity of
citizenship between al'plaintiffs and all defendants.' The citizenship of a
partnership or unincorporated association is, for purposes of determining fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction, that of each of its members.2 As a result of this rule,
many associations and their obligees find themselves barred from bringing suit
on the basis of diversity in the federal courts. Courts and commentators have
unsuccessfully advocated the establishment of an association jural entity, with
citizenship based on the association's principal place of business 3 or on a con-
sideration of the residences of the association's controlling members only.4
Because of the attractiveness of the federal court system,5 multistate unincor-
porated associations and those who wish to sue them have responded to the
situation by devising means to circumvent this harsh requirement.
One method of obtaining diversity jurisdiction upon an unincorporated
association is to bring an action on an association obligation, but only against
the individual diverse members. 6 The partnership form lends itself particu-
larly well to this type of action because each partner is responsible for liabili-
ties of the partnership. 7 Thus, in Jones Knitting Corp. v. A.M. Pullen & Co. ,8
plaintiff was allowed to amend its complaint to drop the nondiverse partners
1. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). The citizenship of an individual is
determined by his domicile. Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 (1915). A corporation is a citizen of
both the state of its principal place of business and that of its incorporation. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)
(1976).
2. Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900); Chapman v. Barney, 129
U.S. 677 (1889). In United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the rule by refusing to recognize a labor union as a judicial personality with a
single residence. The Court felt that the expansion of diversity jurisdiction that would have re-
sulted from such recognition was properly a matter for legislative action. Id. at 153. No such
action has since been taken.
3. See, e.g., Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964); ALI Study of
Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts § 1301(b)(2) (1969); Comment, Citi-
zenship of Unincorporated Associations for Diversity Purposes, 50 Va. L. Rev. 1135 (1964); Com-
ment, Diversity Jurisdiction for Unincorporated Associations, 75 Yale L. J. 138 (1965). A similar
result has already been achieved with regard to the residence of an unincorporated association for
venue purposes. See Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556
(1967).
4. See generally Navarro Say. Assn v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966);
Comment, Limited Partnerships and Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 384 (1978).
5. "[I]t is ... generally acknowledged that the federal courts and federal judiciary in gen-
eral enjoy a merited excellent reputation, and many attorneys have invoked diversity jurisdiction
on behalf of their clients because of a preference for the procedures and judicial administration
available in the federal courts." Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and
Future, 43 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1964). The burgeoning diversity caseloads of the federal courts
suggest the continued vitality of this statement.
6. See, e.g., Kaplan Co. v. Industrial Risk Insurers, 86 F.R.D. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Hamond
v. Clapp, 452 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (mem.); Isdaner v. Beyer, 53 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Jones Knitting Corp. v. A.M. Pullen & Co., 50 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
7. Uniform Partnership Act § 15.
8. 50 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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to avoid dismissal of the suit due to lack of diversity.9 The district court de-
fined the residence of a partnership as determined by the citizenship of those
partners actually joined in the action and by the citizenship of those who, as
indispensable parties, must be joined.' 0
Another procedure used to avoid diversity requirements is the class action
suit, as applied to unincorporated associations by Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23.2,11 where diversity is based on the residences of the named represent-
atives only.12 The class action operates best when a large, decentralized
association is involved-such as a nationwide labor union-and joinder of all
members is unrealistic. 13 While the class action offers a simpler and procedur-
ally more efficient lawsuit than does the Jones-type action, its availability for
the purpose of avoiding diversity requirements is unclear. This Note will ex-
amine the full ramifications and effectiveness of both the class action and the
Jones device.
To join less than all members in a suit on an association obligation
presumes that each named member may be held individually accountable for
the liabilities of the association. This is a question of state law that only inci-
dentally concerns the question of federal diversity jurisdiction. Individual lia-
bility of a member of a nonpartnership, unincorporated association cannot be
predicated on membership alone,14 but may rest on participation in,15 or
knowledge and ratification of, an association act. 16 The lack of uniform indi-
vidual liability renders a Jones-type procedure less attractive to one suing a
nonpartnership association because it injects the additional issue of whether
the named member participated in or ratified the act sued upon.
That a cause of action exists against an individual partner upon partner-
ship liability, however, is clear from the Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.).17
Section 15 provides that all partners are jointly and severally liable for the
9. Id. at 315-16.
10. Id. at 315.
11. "An action brought by or against the members of an unincorporated association as a class
by naming certain members as representative parties may be maintained only if it appears that the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the association and its
members." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.2.
12. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Patrician Towers Owners, Inc.
v. Fairchild, 513 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1975); Pyle v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 634
(D.C. Or. 1972).
13. See, e.g., Local 194, Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. Standard Brands, Inc., 540
F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1976); United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Watson, 409 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 902 (1969); American Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 44 F.R.D. 47
(N.D. Okla. 1968).
14. Cox v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 126 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 1942); Vandervelde
v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 43 F.R.D. 14, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
15. See Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527, 534 (Me. 1973).
16. See Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 181 F. Supp. 809, 815 (N.D. Iowa
1960); Fredstrom v. Giroux Post, No. 11 of Am. Legion, 94 F. Supp. 983, 985 (W.D. Mich. 1951).
Such individual liability will generally be joint and several. See Dunlap Printing Co. v. Ryan, 275
Pa. 556, 119 A. 714 (1923). Members of a for-profit nonpartnership association may be personally
liable for an association act just as partners would. See Burks v. Weast, 67 Cal. App. 745, 228 P.
541 (1924).
17. Adopted by 48 states and the District of Columbia as of January, 1980. 6 Uniform Laws
Ann. I (Supp. 1981).
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wrongful act or omission of any partner and for the misapplication of a third
party's property and jointly liable for all other debts and obligations of the
partnership.18 By holding each partner individually liable for a partnership
liability, the U.P.A. embraces, at least in this area,19 the aggregate theory of
partnership, where the partnership is nothing more than a grouping of individ-
ual partners. 20 The entity theory of partnership 2' requires an action on a part-
nership obligation to be brought against the partnership itself, as all legal
rights and obligations flow from the entity, and partners are liable only
through the primary liability of the entity. Thus, utilization of the Jones
method of enforcing partnership obligations depends on the strength of the
aggregate theory.22
The major limitation on the Jones procedure is the requirement that all
indispensable parties to the litigation be joined.23 Indispensability in the fed-
eral courts is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. In determining
whether an action may proceed absent certain parties, rule 19 calls for a prag-
matic consideration of the interests of the parties before the court, the interests
of the parties absent from the court, and judicial economy.24 The ultimate
question of joinder is a matter of federal procedure and controlled by federal
law.25
The most important consideration in determining the indispensability of
jointly liable parties under the rule 19 approach is the posture of the parties to
18. All of these acts are chargeable to the partnership. Uniform Partnership Act §§ 13 & 14.
19. For a discussion of which areas of the U.P.A. reflect the aggregate theory, and which the
entity theory, see Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an Aggregate or an
Entity?, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 377 (1963).
20. W. Cary, Partnership Planning 7 (1970); J. Crane & A. Bromberg, Law of Partnership 27
(2d ed. 1968).
21. The entity theory has been adopted in the case law of two states. See Smith v. McMick-
en, 3 La. Ann. 319 (1848); Layman v. Readers' Digest Ass'n, Inc., 412 P.2d 192 (Okla. 1965), but
there appears to be no real movement to revise Uniform Partnership Act § 15 to render the part-
ners liable only through the partnership. The entity theory, however, is widely applied by courts
in situations when equity requires, see Jensen, supra note 19, at 384-87, and has been applied
within the framework of Section 15 in Southard v. Oil Equip. Corp., 296 P.2d 780, 784 (Okla.
1956).
22. When an action to enforce a partnership obligation is maintained against less than all
partners as individuals, solely to acquire diversity jurisdiction, the argument exists that equity
requires the entity's obligations to be pursued initially against the entity. This argument becomes
more forceful when the number of partners sued and their involvement with the acts in question
lessens. However, plaintiffs' need to use this procedure to acquire federal jurisdiction has implic-
itly been found to override these considerations in the Jones line of cases.
23. See Jones Knitting Corp. v. A.M. Pullen & Co., 50 F.R.D. 311, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
24. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). Under rule 19, persons materially interested in the subject of an
action should be joined as parties so that they may be heard and a complete disposition of the case
made. Id. 19(a). When this joinder cannot be accompished-because of limitations on service of
process, subject matter jurisdiction, or venue-the court must determine whether the particular
persons are mere necessary parties, and thus the action may proceed in their absence, or whether
the persons are indispensable parties, and thus the action must be dismissed. Id. 19(b). The
factors affecting the determination include: the extent to which a judgment rendered in the per-
son's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; the potential for lessening or
avoiding this prejudice by the shaping of relief; whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate; and whether the plaintiffwill have an adequate remedy if the action is
dismissed. Id., Adv. Comm. Note.
25. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 125 (1968).
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the litigation. The served partners are potentially prejudiced by the possibility
of their individual property being subject to levy and execution on a judg-
ment26 and the resulting need to bring an action against their partners for
indemnification. 27 When the action is brought against most of the members of
a stable ongoing business, where partnership ties are strong, courts recognize
that joint assets will be voluntarily used to satisfy a judgment and thus the
potential prejudice to any one member is slight.28 However, if the potential
exposure would tax the partnership assets, or if the partnership arrangement is
more akin to an arms-length relation-as when corporations join together to
pursue a joint venture in partnership form-these dangers assume a greater
presence. Prejudice to the unjoined partners will depend on whether judg-
ment may be executed on their portion of the joint assets29 as well as on the
strength of the partnership ties30 and the res judicata effect on the unnamed
partners of a judgment against the joined partners as individuals.31
Federal courts formerly based indispensability findings on state law and
thus equated joint obligors, including all partners on a contract claim,32 to
indispensible parties, as dictated by the strict common law joinder rule.33
Since the amendment of rule 19, these conclusory determinations in cases in-
volving contractual relations have largely, but not invariably, been
26. See text accompanying notes 40-49 infra.
27. Uniform Partnership Act § 18(b) requires the partnership to indemnify every partner for
payments made and liabilities reasonably incurred in the ordinary and proper conduct of busi-
ness, subject to any agreement among the partners. Rights to indemnification may be excluded
altogether by the partners' agreement. See Goffv. Bergerman, 97 Colo. 363, 368, 50 P.2d 59, 61
(1935). Upon dissolution, the liability of the partnership to indemnify a partner comes after liabil-
ities to outside creditors. See Uniform Partnership Act § 40(b).
28. See, e.g., Hamond v. Clapp, 452 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (mem.) (one unjoined
partner, law partnership); Isdaner v. Beyer, 53 F.R1D. 4 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (25 of over 200 partners in
Touche, Ross & Co. were unjoined, total claim was $200,000); Jones Knitting Corp. v. A.M.
Pullen & Co., 50 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (defendant was accounting firm with 22 of 59 part-
ners joined). While Rule 19 recognizes that it is desirable to settle controversies in wholes, the fact
that a plaintiff could do so by bringing suit against all partners in state court has been held not to
preclude proceeding in federal court. Kaplan Co. v. Industrial Risk Insurers, 86 F.R.D. 484 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
29. In Federal Resources Corp. v. Shoni Uranium Corp., 408 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1969), the
partnership consisted of two corporations. Substantially all of the net income of one partner came
om partnership operations. The claim was for just under two million dollars, and Wyoming law
allowed a judgment against one of two partners to be executed on partnership property. These
facts led the court to conclude that both corporations were indispensable parties to an action based
on a partnership obligation, because the unjoined partner "might here be economically wiped out
without ever having a day in court." Id. at 878.
30. See id. In Isdaner v. Beyer, 53 F.R.D. 4, 6 (E.D. Pa. 1971), the court emphasized that the
unjoined partners would be represented by the same partnership counsel if there were any need of
further litigation.
31. The large majority of courts that have considered the question have held that a judgment
upon a partnership obligation against less than all partners does not conclusively establish the
existence of a partnership debt as against another partner not made a party to the former proceed-
ing or judgment. For a full listing of cases on the issue see Annot., I1 A.L.R12d 847 (1950).
32. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
33. Since there is but one obligation and one cause of action for its breach, all joint obligors
must be joined in the action. 2 S. Williston, Law of Contracts, § 327, at 668 (3d ed. W. Jaeger
1959); accord, Eastern Metals Corp. v. Martin, 191 F. Supp. 245, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Weaver v.
Marcus, 73 F. Supp. 736, 738 (W.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 165 F.2d 862 (1948).
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eliminated.34
Another common law concept which has continued to affect federal indis-
pensability analysis is the state joint debtor statute.35 Originally designed to
ameliorate the harsh effects of the common law joinder rule,36 these statutes
have recently been applied by federal courts to actions based on partnership
liability for the purpose of determining that the unjoined partners were not
indispensible parties to the action.37 Courts so holding reason that since the
statutes allow the action to continue against the joined partners alone, the un-
joined partners are merely necessary parties, to be joined only if feasible.3 8
Reliance on this theory is unnecessary under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
19. Further, such an application ignores the procedural limitations built into
the original operation of the statutes to prevent their use as a means for the
plaintiff to choose which jointly liable partner he would sue.39
While bringing suit against less than all partners may be possible under
Rule 19, there is less certainty in regard to the enforceability of the plaintiffs
judgment. In a claim against one or more partners as individuals, partnership
34. See Isdaner v. Beyer, 53 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (holding jointly liable partners not
indispensable solely on basis of rule 19 balancing approach). But see Federal Resources Corp. v.
Shorn Uranium Corp., 408 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding both corporate partners indispensa-
ble parties to an action on a partnership contract, since contract was with partnership and not any
individual partner); Codagnone v. Perrin, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 989 (D.R.I. 1972) (in action against
tortfeasor agent, principal held to be indispensable party).
35. These acts generally provide that "[w]here less than all the named defendants.. . are
served with summons, the plaintiff may proceed against the parties served. . . and if the judg-
ment is for the plaintiff it may be taken against all the defendants." N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1501
(McKinney 1976). The New York statute, enacted in 1788, has served as a model in other states.
See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-113 (1969).
36. See McLoren, Venue, Process and Parties in Business Litigation, 1954 U. Ill. L.F. 557,
562. For a discussion of the historical development of the procedures used to lessen the effects of
the strict common law rule in partnership cases, see generally Campbell, Partnership Obligations
and Their Enforcement, 32 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 127, 128-31 (1954). For a listipg of statutory modi-
fications to the rights and duties of joint obligors in general, see 2 S. Williston, supra note 33,
§ 336, at 697.
37. See Hamond v. Clapp, 152 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (mem.); Jones Knitting Corp. v.
A.M. Pullen & Co., 50 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); James Talcott, Inc. v. Burke, 145 F. Supp, 489
(N.D. Ohio 1956) (one partner and the partnership entity declared not indispensable and venue
requirements thereby met).
38. Jones Knitting Corp. v. A.M. Pullen & Co., 50 F.R.D. at 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See note
24 supra.
39. The language of the statute assumes that all jointly liable parties will be named as de-
fendants and will remain as defendants untiljudgment. See Miller v. Farino, 58 A.D.2d 731, 395
N.Y.S.2d 867 (1977) (mem.); Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Bush, 31 Misc. 2d 70, 219 N.Y.S.2d
453 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (per curiam); Robertson v. Club Ephrata, 56 Wash. 2d 108, 351 P.2d 412
(1960); and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-113(1) (1969). Requiringjoinder of all partners reflects the persis-
tent belief that partnership debts are peculiarly joint in their substantive character, and thus part-
ners should sue or be sued together except where procedural inequities would ensue. This view is
evidenced by only eight states (Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri, North Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Texas) having modified the joint liability of partners via the substantively con-
trolling U.P.A., in the face of procedural modifications to allow suit against a single joint debtor in
a large majority ofjurisdictions. 6 Uniform Laws Ann. 38, 175 (1968 & Supp. 1981). Also, many
state statutes now allow service to be made on a partnership through one of its members, leading
to the same result as the joint debtor acts. But to effect such service, the partnership must be
formally named in the complaint. See Johnson v. Albritton, 101 Fla. 1285, 134 So. 563 (1931);
Rait v. Jacobs Bros., 49 Misc. 2d 903, 268 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Walsh v. Kirby, 228 Pa.
St. 194, 77 A. 452 (1910).
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assets will not be subject to judgment, even though the claim is predicated on a
partnership act. The U.P.A. prohibits execution on specific partnership prop-
erty unless the claim is against the partnership.40 Since the plaintiff's purpose
in a Jones-type action is to avoid serving all partners,4 ' or the partnership
itself,42 such a claim would not run against the partnership property.43 The
same result is reached outside of the U.P.A. because if neither the partnership
nor all partners are served, the served partners appear as individuals to protect
their own interests only.a" This follows from the general rule that a judgment
rendered without notice to, or service on a defendant, in this case the partner-
ship, is void for want of jurisdiction.45
Joint debtor statutes allow judgment to be executed on joint property
when some partners are not served, but this result is based on constructive
notice being given to the unserved partners through service on either the part-
nership entity or the served partners as representatives of the whole.46 Con-
structive notice excuses service of process on the partnership, but its presence
as a party to the action is still required.47 Thus, judgment in a Jones action,
whether proceeding under the U.P.A., the common law, or a joint debtor stat-
ute, is limited to the served partners' individual property,48 which includes
their rights to partnership income.49
40. Uniform Partnership Act § 25(2)(c).
41. This was the only method of obtaining jurisdiction over a partnership at common law.
See J. Crane & A. Bromberg, supra note 20, § 58(a). This method would support a judgment
against partnership assets even if the partnership itself was not named as a party. See Palkovitz v.
Second Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 412 Pa. 547, 195 A.2d 347 (1963).
42. Many states have statutes permitting a partnership to sue or be sued in its common name.
J. Crane & A. Bromberg, supra note 20, § 57(b).
43. See McLaren, supra note 36, at 562.
44. In this situation the appearance of noninvolvement by the entity is reinforced where stat-
utes confer jurisdiction over the partnership simply by naming the entity as a defendant while
effecting service on any one partner. See J. Crane & A. Bromberg, supra note 20, § 60.
45. See 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 23, at 52 (1947), and cases cited thereunder, and Restatement
of Judgments § 4 (1942).
46. The constitutionality of executing a judgment on partnership property that is jointly
owned by unserved partners was upheld in Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U.S. 524 (1889). The court
treated the partnership as a distinct legal entity. Id. at 530-31. See Comment, Jurisdiction over
Partnerships, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 793, 804 (1924), for suggestion that application of joint debtor acts
requires implicit recognition of the partnership entity as the conduit through which notice of the
action is delivered to the unserved partners. But see Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 182, 155 N.E.
93 (1926) (the nonserved partners receive notice sufficient to allow a judgment on their commonly
held property by virtue of the statute which provides for such a judgment on a joint claim, and
service on one partner on a joint claim which names all defendants); J. Crane & A. Bromberg,
supra note 20, § 59, for listing of cases applying joint debtor acts while rejecting entity theory.
47. See note 39 supra.
48. A line of early cases, primarily in Pennsylvania, reached a contrary result based on the
pre-U.P.A. practice of allowing one partner to confess a judgment for a partnership debt without
the consent of his partners. These cases reasoned that a plaintiff should be able to force a partner
to apply partnership assets to satisfy a judgment because the partner could do so voluntarily. See,
e.g., Winters v. Means, 25 Neb. 241, 41 N.W. 157 (1888); Harper v. Fox, 7 Watts & Serg. 142 (Pa.
1844). Uniform Partnership Act § 9(3), however, states that no partner has the power to confess a
judgment against the partnership unless he is authorized to do so by all the partners. Thus the
former practice shouldbe unavailable today, and a judgment may be executed only on the assets
of the individual served. See Fairman Bros. v. Ogden Gas Co., 106 Pa. Super. 130, 161 A. 634
(1932).
49. "A partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus, and the
19811
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[o
Another procedural method utilized to preserve diversity in an action in-
volving a multi-state, unincorporated association is to bring a class action suit
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.2.50 This is possible because the
citizenship of the class is that of the named representatives only,51 who can
usually be chosen to insure complete diversity. Also, while all members of the
association are not formal parties to the action, they are bound by the judg-
ment.52 Thus the Jones action's difficulties of executing judgment on the asso-
ciation's assets may be avoided. There are several unresolved issues regarding
the proper interpretation of rule 23.2, however, that may proscribe its use in
this context.
One issue is whether the requirements of rule 23(a)53 must be satisfied in
an action brought under rule 23.2. One school of thought emphasizes that rule
23.2 expressly incorporates one of the requirements of rule 23(a)-that the
representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the associ-
ation-thus negatively implying that the remainder of rule 23(a) was inten-
tionally omitted.54 Further, because the purpose of rule 23.2 is to give entity
treatment to associations through the class action device,55 the formal require-
ments of rule 23(a) should be subordinated whenever they may prevent quali-
fication of an association as a class.56
Several courts have taken the opposite view, however, on the grounds that
the requirements of rule 23(a) are the essential foundation of any class ac-
tion.57 The numerosity requirement of rule 23(a), applied to rule 23.2 actions
same is personal property." Uniform Partnership Act § 26. Any judgment creditor of a partner
may petition a court of competent jurisdiction to charge the interest in the partnership of a debtor
partner with payment of the unsatisfied amount of such judgment debt, and the court may appoint
a receiver of his share of the profits. Id. § 28(1).
50. See note 11 supra. This rule was added in 1966 to deal specifically with actions relating
to unincorporated associations. These actions had formerly been regulated by the general provi-
sions of Rule 23. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.2 Adv. Comm. Note.
51. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Calagaz v. Calhoun, 309 F.2d
248 (5th Cir. 1962). With plaintiff partners, uniformly held to be indispensable parties, see J.
Crane & A. Bromberg, supra note 20, § 55(a), this maybe the oniy way for a national partnership
to bring suit under diversity jurisdiction.
52. "It is a familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of a class not present as
parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately repre-
sented by parties who are present." Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). See also Christo-
pher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. IBS, 237 U.S. 662 (1915).
53. These requirements are: 1) the class is so large that the joinder of all members is im-
practicable; 2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 3) the claims or defenses
of the representative are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 4) the represeptative
parties will adequately and fairly protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
54. See 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1861 (1972).
55. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.2, Adv. Comm. Note.
56. See 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 54, § 1861; accord, Gay Liberation v. Univer-
sity of Mo., 416 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mo.), rev'd on the merits, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1080(1978); Management Television Sys., Inc. v. National Football League, 52
F.R.D. 162 (E.D. Pa. 1971). But see text accompanying notes 69-71 infra.
57. See Merkey v. Board of Regents, 344 F. Supp. 1296 (N.D. Fla.), vacated on other
grounds, 493 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1973); Suchem, Inc. v. Central Aguirre Sugar Co., 52 F.R.D. 348
(D.P.R. 1971); Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704 (D. Colo. 1966).
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by two district courts,58 presents the most compelling argument for application
of rule 23(a). If there is no numerosity requirement, a two-man partnership
could be sued as a class with only the diverse partner being named as the
representative. Even short of this extreme position, use of rule 23.2 solely to
achieve diversity may be improper. The general purpose of a class action is to
allow suit to proceed where joinder of all parties is impractical,5 9 and the pur-
pose of rule 23.2 in particular is to permit suit where the impracticality stems
from traditional procedural treatment of the unincorporated association.60
Where modern procedures allowing associations to sue or be sued as an entity
are available, 61 these purposes are inapposite and application of rule 23.2 is
merely a means of circumscribing diversity requirements.
The issue whether a rule 23.2 action may proceed in the face of state laws
granting unincorporated associations the capacity to sue or be sued is the sec-
ond major question in this area. In general, capacity to sue in diversity actions
is governed by state law.62 Before rule 23.2 was enacted, a class action was
unavailable where state law granting unincorporated associations capacity to
sue was intended to be the exclusive means for an association to sue or be
sued.63 Where state law granting an association the capacity to sue was
merely permissive, however, a class action was available.64 It is unclear how
rule 23.2 has changed the law in this area. Commentators65 and one district
court66 have interpreted rule 23.2 as a procedural device which supplements
state practice in this area. They argue that the Erie doctrine67 requires this
federal procedure to remain available even where state law clearly provides an
exclusive means for an association to sue or be sued.68
Other courts, however, have relied on the Committee Note to rule 23.2 to
support a different view.69 The Note provides that the purpose of rule 23.2 is
"to give 'entity treatment' to the association when for formal reasons it cannot
sue or be sued as a jural person under rule 17(b)." 70 This suggests that the
58. Suchem, Inc. v. Central Aguirre Sugar Co., 52 F.R.D. 348 (D.P.R. 1971); Rippey v. Den-
ver United States Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704 (D. Colo. 1966).
59. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948).
60. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.2, Adv. Comm. Note.
61. See note 42 supra.
62. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
63. Underwood v. Malone, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958).
64. Oskoian v. Canuel, 269 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1959).
65. See 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 54, § 1861; 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice
23.2.02 (3d ed. 1980).
66. See Pyle v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 634 (D. Or. 1974).
67. If a matter is covered by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and that rule is valid, then it
is controlling regardless of state law to the contrary. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965);
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
68. See 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 54, § 1861.
69. Patrician Towers Owners, Inc. v. Fairchild, 513 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1975); Lee v. Navarro
Sav. Ass'n, 416 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd on'other grounds, 97 F.2d 421 (5th Cir.
1979), rev'd, 446 U.S. 458 (1980); Suchem, Inc. v. Central Aguirre Sugar Co., 52 F.R.D. 348
(D.P.R. 1971).
70. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.2, Adv. Comm. Note.
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rule is not operative until Rule 17(b), which points to state law, prohibits en-
tity treatment.71 This would bar the use of a class action even in states which
permissively allow unincorporated associations to sue or be sued in their com-
mon name.
The future use of Rule 23.2 to maintain diversity jurisdiction clearly
hinges on the outcome of these issues. Imposition of the numerosity require-
ment of Rule 23(a) would prevent many associations from qualifying as a
class, and the widespread availability of state statutes allowing entity treat-
ment could virtually preclude use of Rule 23.2 in this context. The ongoing
debate over these questions and resultant split in court decisions relegate the
class action device to an uncertain means of maintaining federal diversity ac-
tions in many jurisdictions.
In the area of diversity jurisdiction over unincorporated associations, ju-
dicial development is at a crossroad. Federal courts have applied the same
harsh rule of an association's residence through the past century. 72 In an ef-
fort to open the federal courts to unincorporated associations, litigators and
courts have utilized divergent concepts such as joint debtor acts and class ac-
tions, and attempted to fit them into the diversity jurisdiction puzzle. 73
Both procedural tools are designed to facilitate the bringing of a suit
where joinder of a whole group is inconvenient. But they are not tailored to
solve all the problems raised by their interaction with the rule of an associa-
tion's residence in the diversity context, thus the procedural guidelines for un-
incorporated association litigation are less than plain. A Jones action exists by
virtue of the aggregate theory of partnership, but that theory's uncertain foun-
dation is undermined by this use. The geometric increase in the level of com-
plexity of rules concerning judgments occasioned by the introduction of Jones
procedures leaves unwary plaintiffs vulnerable to hard fought, yet unenforce-
able, judgments. Nor is the class action device a consistently effective tool. In
many cases, its use is justifiable only through a desire to circumvent diversity
requirements, and this leads to an opposing school of thought that would deny
this possibility.
The purpose of this note is not to suggest a solution, but to expose some
inherent dangers of the present situation. From this examination, however, it
is apparent that a simpler procedural system would result from granting unin-
corporated associations a residence for diversity purposes. The pressure to-
wards this end evidenced by the increased use of the Jones action and class
action tools coupled with the willingness of many courts to accept such use of
those procedures reflect an increasingly prevalent view that manipulative dan-
gers are but necessary incidents to the more important consideration of pro-
71. See Suchem, Inc. v. Central Aguirre Sugar Co., 52 F.R.D. at 355.
72. See note 2 supra.
73. Comment, Citizenship of Unincorporated Associations for Diversity Purposes, supra note
3, at 1142; Comment, Diversity Jurisdiction for Unincorporated Associations, supra note 3, at 143-
44.
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viding unincorporated associations with a much needed federal forum.
74
DAVID A. STOCKTON
74. See 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 54, § 1861; Cohn, The New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 54 Gee. L.I 1204, 1226 (1966).

